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HANG ON TO YOUR HATS! TERRY INTO
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
ERIC L. MULLER*
The title of our section of this Symposium is "Terry and the
Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Into the 21st Cen-
tury," so I'd like to spend my time on an important point of
agreement between Professors Amar and Slobogin that indicates
a promising path for Fourth Amendment doctrine. This is a path
that could carry the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
"reasonable" police conduct into areas of police-citizen interac-
tion that are currently outside the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment entirely. It is a path worth traveling, or at least exploring,
because there is a potential for a great deal of mischief in this
currently uncharted terrain. By talking briefly about one small
piece of this terrain-the so-called "community caretaker" doc-
trine-I hope to persuade you that the central idea of Terry v.
Ohio' and its progeny will remain relevant in the next century.
At a conference devoted entirely to Terry v. Ohio, it is, of
course, dangerous to refer to "the central idea of Terry" as
though that were self-defining. I take the central idea of Terry to
be its refreshing flexibility: Its willingness to break from the ri-
gidity of the probable cause requirement, and to recognize that
police officers interact with citizens in many more ways than a
strict Warrant Clause approach would envision. It is important
to remember that police officers were stopping and frisking sus-
pects on the streets for years before 1968.2 The Terry decision
did not create the stop-and-frisk; police officers did. Terry's in-
novation was its honesty, its willingness to acknowledge that
things were happening on the streets that did not easily fit a
Warrant Clause model, but that still deserved some form of
scrutiny by judges. The flexibility offered by Terry was, of
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (1994).
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course, quite limited: It replaced a single level of police suspi-
cion, probable cause, with two levels, probable cause and reason-
able suspicion. Furthermore, Terry opened the eyes of the judges
only to the stop-and-frisk-a single and fairly intrusive sort of
investigative technique that did not look quite like a full-blown
arrest or a formal search. However, Terry introduced the idea
that the Fourth Amendment might have relevance across at
least a somewhat broader segment of a continuum of police-
citizen encounters, and for this I believe it deserves praise.
Professors Amar and Slobogin believe this too. What links
their work most powerfully, and most usefully, is their endorse-
ment of the sliding scale in Fourth Amendment analysis. Profes-
sor Slobogin advocates that "the level of certainty necessary to
authorize a police action.., be governed solely by the level of its
intrusiveness."3 This proposal, referred to as "the proportionality
principle," is an unabashed call for a sliding scale approach to
the Fourth Amendment.4 The less intrusive the investigative
tactic, the less certain of wrongdoing the police need be in order
to use it. His approach dramatically de-emphasizes the eternally
perplexing inquiry into whether a particular police tactic consti-
tutes a classically defined "search" or "seizure," and instead fo-
cuses attention on how intrusive, and how justified, the tactic
was. His approach also carries the Fourth Amendment below
full-blown Warrant-Clause searches, past Terry-style stop-and-
frisks, to even the most minimally intrusive police tactics.
I read Professor Amar to favor a sliding scale as well, al-
though one that examines a richer set of factors than does the
Slobogin proportionality principle. For Professor Amar, the
sliding scale is right there in the text of the Fourth Amendment:
The reasonableness requirement. Searches and seizures by war-
rant need to be supported by probable cause, but all searches
and seizures must be reasonable. And reasonableness is, of ne-
cessity, a sliding scale: As Professor Amar states, "serious
crimes and serious needs can justify more serious searches and
seizures."5 Admittedly, the Amar sliding scale differs in major
3 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 68 (1991).
Id. at 75 (describing the proportionality principle as requiring "a flexible, sliding
scale analysis").
" Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
802(1994).
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ways from the Slobogin sliding scale. Professor Slobogin's in-
quiry into proportionality involves a straightforward focus on in-
trusiveness. On the other hand, Professor Amar's inquiry into
reasonableness involves an examination of a much wider array of
factors, including not just the degree of intrusion but also the
impact of the police tactic on other constitutional norms.6 De-
spite their differences, the two proposals we have heard about
today share a common desire to expand the scope of the Fourth
Amendment to a much broader segment of the spectrum of po-
lice-citizen interaction than the current two-tiered approach can
capture. Their proposals make good on Terry's promise of
Fourth Amendment flexibility.
Because this is an important promise, these are important
proposals. Terry itself called judicial attention to the stop-and-
frisk, and thereby brought some semblance of order to what had
been an entirely unregulated police practice. A great deal of in-
vestigatory mischief remains undetected thirty years after Terry
because it remains entirely outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. One fertile area for such mischief is the so-called
"community caretaking" function of the police. I would like to
describe the community caretaker doctrine to you in the hopes
that you will come to see it as a type of police-citizen interaction
calling for some form of judicial supervision, just as the stop-and-
frisk had done thirty years ago.
You have probably heard the old joke that the most terrify-
ing words a person can ever hear are "I'm from the government,
and I'm here to help you." That joke is a fairly accurate descrip-
tion of the community caretaker doctrine. The police officer on
the beat does more than just investigate crime; he also helps
stranded motorists, gets the neighbor to turn down the stereo,
rescues cats from trees, gives directions, helps lost children find
their parents, and generally does good deeds in the community.
Because the courts typically see these "community caretaking
functions" as being "totally divorced from the detection, investi-
gation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute,"7 they often do not recognize them as engaging
6 See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998); see also Amar, supra note 5, at 804-11 (examining other
constitutional objectives to Fourth Amendment cases to determine constitutional rea-
sonableness).Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
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Fourth Amendment concerns at all.'
Whenever the courts leave an entire category of police-
citizen interaction largely unsupervised, you can expect some
mischief; and mischief is what you get. Allow me to read you the
facts of a case from the State of Washington called State v.
Chisholm.9 To quote the well-known legal scholar Dave Barry, "I
am not making this up":10
On November 15, 1980 at approximately 12:30 a.m.,
Sergeant Cowan of the Longview Police Department ob-
served a pickup truck moving in traffic with a hat resting
on top of the cab. The officer, driving an unmarked police
vehicle, watched as the hat blew into the bed. Concerned
that the hat was endangered, Sergeant Cowan attempted
to stop the truck. Having no success, the officer sum-
moned a marked police vehicle to make the stop....
Upon walking up to the cab, Sergeant Cowan saw an
open can of beer between the driver and his passen-
ger,... both known by Sergeant Cowan to be minors. The
occupants were placed under arrest and a later search of
[the passenger's] person produced a quantity of mari-
juana, for which he was charged with possession."
It is safe to say that these two young fellows probably could
have gotten by just fine without Sergeant Cowan's "help," not to
8 See, e.g., United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
police entry into an intoxicated defendant's home, at the request of the defendant's
guests in order to retrieve their belongings, was not a Fourth Amendment search);
Thompson v. State, 797 S.W.2d 450, 451-52 (Ark. 1990) (determining that the police
encounter with an intoxicated defendant was not a Fourth Amendment seizure be-
cause police were acting in a caretaker capacity, precipitated by their observation of
the defendant's parked car with the lights and motor on); State v. Halfmann, 518
N.W.2d 729, 730-31 (N.D. 1994) (holding that an officer's questioning of an intoxicated
defendant after she pulled off the road was not a Fourth Amendment stop but a com-
munity caretaker action); State v. Quigley, 786 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)
(concluding that a police officer's initial contact with the defendant was not a Fourth
Amendment stop because the officer approached the defendant out of concern for the
defendant's safety after observing the defendant's car parked in an isolated lot with
fogged up windows). But see State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411, 413-14 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (recognizing that community caretaker functions can sometimes amount to
Fourth Amendment "searches" or "seizures"), rev'd on other grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
9 696 P.2d 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). My thanks to fellow panelist Scott Sundby for
bringing this wonderful example of the community caretaking doctrine to my atten-
tion.
10 See, e.g., DAVE BARRY, DAVE BARRY IS NOT MAKING THIS UP (1995).
" Chisholm, 696 P.2d at 42 (emphasis added).
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mention without the hat.2
The reporters are full of cases in which an officer's offer of
aid, or his seemingly innocent desire to "ask just a few ques-
tions" of a passerby, turns quickly into reasonable suspicion, or
even full-blown probable cause. It will not do to say that the
Fourth Amendment has no concern for these cases because a po-
lice officer who is playing the role of the community caretaker is
not "searching." As Professor Amar points out, the Secret Serv-
ice agent who merely scans the crowd surrounding the President
is performing a very real "search," albeit not an especially intru-
sive one. 3 Law enforcement officers carry their attentiveness
and their suspicion with them everywhere, just as they carry
their service revolvers.
To place community caretaking encounters between the po-
lice and the citizens completely outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment is to create an enormous pocket of unreviewed and
essentially unreviewable'4 discretion in the daily activities of law
enforcement. While it is impossible to know just how common it
is for police to engage in Chisolm-style abuse of the community
caretaker function, 5 the scope of police discretion is enormous,
12 For a tragic example of apparently good-faith community caretaldng gone awry,
see Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1992). Here an officer approached a young
man to help him after she saw him fall off his bicycle. When he rebuffed her efforts to
help, she began to follow him. She ended up shooting and killing him after their inter-
action turned violent.
'3 See Amar, supra note 5, at 768 (describing different types of Fourth Amendment
searches).
14 It remains possible for a defendant to engage the Fourth Amendment by per-
suading a court that an officer's community caretaking efforts were actually a pretext
for a groundless investigatory stop. Indeed, the Chisholm court remanded the case to
the trial court for just such an inquiry. See Chisholm, 696 P.2d at 43 (ordering remand
for suppression hearing to determine whether Sergeant Cowan's actions were
"subterfuge"). However, the Supreme Court recently expressed strong disapproval of
pretext analysis in Fourth Amendment cases. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996). In Whren, the Court made clear that the "[slubjective intentions [of police
officers] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id- at
813. Pretext analysis might not be an adequate strategy for regulating the police in
their community caretaldng role.
15 Professor James J. Fyfe's interesting contribution to this Symposium suggests
that such manipulation may be more common than we suspect. He quotes from a
training manual for police officers which instructs officers to use community caretak-
ing for investigative purposes. See James J. Fyfe, Terry: A[n-Ex-] Cop's View, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1231 (1998) (quoting GEORGE T. PAYTON & MICHAEL AMARAL, PATROL
OPERATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT TACTICS 203-07 (9th ed. 1993)) (noting the manual's
instruction that where an officer sees a suspicious person who does not appear to fit
into the community, the officer should approach him and say, "Good evening, sir. Are
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as is the potential for abuse. If Terry teaches us anything, it
teaches us the value of opening our eyes to existing law enforce-
ment practices that may not look like traditional searches or sei-
zures, but that leave the police free to accomplish the results of
traditional searches and seizures without any real strictures. To
quote Professor Amar, "[rule-of-law values affirmed in various
constitutional ways... teach us to be especially wary of searches
and seizures that allow too much arbitrariness and ad hocery,
unbounded by public, visible rules promulgated in advance by
legislatures and executive agencies."6
Having said that Professors Slobogin and Amar both offer
approaches to the Fourth Amendment that can help us to explore
currently uncharted areas of police-citizen interaction, I should
also say that I believe Professor Slobogin's approach holds less
promise than Professor Amar's. Both speak of a "proportionality
principle"-the idea that "more serious intrusions require more
weighty justifications."17 For Amar, the degree of intrusiveness
is just the starting point of the inquiry into Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. For Slobogin, it is also the ending point. Admit-
tedly, Professor Slobogin entitles a portion of his paper
"Incorporating Other Interests Into Invasiveness Analysis." 8
Here Slobogin chides the Court for "fail[ing] to take into account
those interests aside from privacy, property, and autonomy that
are protected by other provisions of the Constitution." 9 But it is
not clear to me why interests aside from "privacy, property, and
autonomy" have any place in Professor Slobogin's Fourth
Amendment world. Reasonableness, for Slobogin, is a function of
invasiveness: "[A] search or seizure is reasonable if the strength
of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of intru-
sion associated with the police action."20 The chief virtue of this
proposal is, of course, its clarity. Invasiveness, and invasiveness
alone, becomes the organizing principle of Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness" analysis.
you looking for a particular place? Maybe I can help you.").
16 Amar, supra note 5, at 809.
17 Amar, supra note 6; see also Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A
Call For Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053
(1998) ("A search or seizure is reasonable if the strength of its justification is roughly
proportionate to the level of intrusion associated with the police action.").
18 See Slobogin, supra note 17.
19 Id2 o Id
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But if that is what Fourth Amendment reasonableness is
about, then Fourth Amendment reasonableness is not about
other things. It is not about race or gender or youth; it is not
about arbitrariness; it is not about public humiliation or har-
assment. However, it seems to me that discriminatory, arbitrary
or needlessly humiliating police tactics can be unreasonable-
even if they are not particularly invasive. We might want to de-
scribe Sergeant Cowan's decision to return Chisholm's hat as un-
reasonable, even if it was not very intrusive. If the Marshals at
the entrance to a federal courthouse were able to set the surveil-
lance camera so that it only actually switched on when a young
person or an African-American person approached, we might
want to describe that practice as "unreasonable," even though it
may not be at all intrusive.21 A police department that re-
sponded more aggressively to noise complaints about loud hip-
hop rather than loud country-western might be acting
"unreasonably," even though not intrusively. In short, if we are
to make good on the promise of Terry and spread the require-
ment of reasonableness across the entire spectrum of police-
citizen interaction, we will probably need a richer definition of
reasonableness than the Slobogin proportionality principle seems
to offer.22
21 It is worth noting that such a practice, deployed against young people, would
probably not independently violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Age is not a suspect classification. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (holding that age is not a suspect classification for
the purposes of equal protection analysis). As a result, the government would need to
supply nothing more than a rational basis for its surveillance system. See Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (holding that only a rational basis is necessary for
justifying classification by age). This is a notoriously easy burden to sustain. The
Fourth Amendments Reasonableness Clause might therefore be the only piece of con-
stitutional text that can capture the unconstitutionality of a youth-targeted surveil-
lance system.
22 In a fascinating passage in his paper, Professor Slobogin correctly observes
that the Supreme Court's unfortunate fascination with the probable cause standard
has driven it to define "searches" and "seizures" in an excessively narrow way. See
Slobogin, supra note 17. As he argues, "[i]f the Court had been willing to recognize
that some relatively less invasive 'searches' and 'seizures' can take place on less
than probable cause it would have felt much more comfortable broadening the defi-
nition of those two terms, instead of declaring, in essence by fiat, that all sorts of
searches and seizures are not." Id.
Regrettably, though, Professor Slobogin is not in a position to capitalize on his
accurate critique of the Supreme Court's approach. While he rightly chides the
Court for failing to recognize that comparatively non-invasive police tactics can con-
stitute "searches" or "seizures," his proportionality principle will produce almost
1147
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I will not attempt in my limited time to predict how the
courts might go about enforcing Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness in community caretaking cases, or in other types of cases
currently off the Fourth Amendment radar screen. I will instead
merely predict, in my role as a commentator on the relevance of
Terry in the next century, that the central idea of Terry will offer
the courts a sound strategy for charting this new terrain. It is
impossible to say exactly where Fourth Amendment law will go,
but I am confident that Terry's refreshing focus on reasonable-
ness will help take us there. So, ladies and gentlemen, onward
to the 21st century! Hang on to your hats!
nothing but rubber-stamped approvals of such police tactics. If the invasiveness of a
police tactic is slight, it needs but slight justification. Thus, while a barely invasive
police tactic would fall within the scope of Slobogin's Fourth Amendment, it would
almost invariably be permissible. If the result of bringing non-invasive police tactics
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment is to approve them categorically, the
change in the law hardly seems worth the trouble.
[72:11411148
